

On the (im)possibility of non-interactive correlation distillation

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Abstract

We study the problem of non-interactive correlation distillation (NICD). Suppose that Alice and Bob each have a string, denoted by $A = a_0a_1 \cdots a_{n-1}$ and $B = b_0b_1 \cdots b_{n-1}$, respectively. Furthermore, for every $k = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$, (a_k, b_k) is drawn independently from a distribution \mathcal{N} , known as the ‘noise model’. Alice and Bob wish to ‘distill’ the correlation non-interactively, i.e., they wish to each apply a function to their strings, and output one random bit, denoted by X and Y , such that $\Pr[X = Y]$ can be made as close to 1 as possible. The problem is, for what noise models can they succeed? This problem is related to various topics in computer science, including information reconciliation and random beacons. In fact, if NICD is indeed possible for some general class of noise models, then some of these topics would, in some sense, become straightforward corollaries.

We prove two negative results on NICD for various noise models. We prove that, for these models, it is impossible to distill the correlation to be arbitrarily close to 1. We also give an example where Alice and Bob can increase their correlation with one bit of communication (in this case they need to each output two bits). This example, which may be of interest on its own, demonstrates that even the smallest amount of communication is provably more powerful than no communication.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Non-interactive correlation distillation

Consider the following scenario. Let \mathcal{N} be a distribution over $\Sigma \times \Sigma$, where Σ is an alphabet. We call \mathcal{N} a ‘noise model’. Suppose that Alice and Bob each receive a string $A = a_0a_1 \cdots a_{n-1}$ and $B = b_0b_1 \cdots b_{n-1}$, respectively, as their local inputs. For every $k = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$, (a_k, b_k) is drawn independently from \mathcal{N} . Now Alice and Bob wish to engage in a protocol to ‘distill’ their correlation. At the end of the protocol, they wish to each output a bit, denoted by X and Y , respectively, such that both X and Y are ‘random enough’, while $\Pr[X = Y]$ can be made as close to 1 as possible, possibly by increasing n . We call such a protocol a *correlation distillation protocol*. Furthermore, if Alice and Bob wish to do so *non-interactively*, i.e., without communication, we call this ‘non-interactive correlation distillation’ (NICD). Notice that, in NICD, the most general thing for Alice and Bob to do is to each apply a function

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to their local inputs and outputs one bit. The problem of NICD is, for what noise model can Alice and Bob achieve this goal?

We note that NICD is indeed possible for some noise models. For example, if a noise model \mathcal{N} is in fact ‘noiseless’, i.e., $\Pr_{(a,b) \in \mathcal{N}}[a = b] = 1$, then NICD is possible. See Section 1.3 for more discussions. However, we are interested in the ‘noisy’ noise models, for example the *binary symmetric model*, where Alice and Bob each have an unbiased bit as input, which agree with probability $1 - p$, and the *binary erasure model*, where Alice’s input is an unbiased bit x and Bob’s input is x with probability $1 - p$, and a special symbol \perp with probability p . These models are studied extensively in the context of error-correcting codes [3,9], where Alice encodes her information before sending it through a ‘noisy channel’. It is known that there exist efficient encoding schemes that withstand these noise models and allow Alice and Bob to achieve almost perfect correlation. However, in the case of NICD, the ‘raw data’ are already noisy. Can the techniques in error-correcting codes be used here, and is NICD possible for these noise models?

1.2. Motivations and related work

Besides the obvious relation to error-correcting codes, the study of NICD is naturally motivated by several other topics. We review these topics and discuss some of the related work.

1.2.1. Information reconciliation

Information reconciliation is an extensively studied topic [4,6–8,15] with applications in quantum cryptography and information-theoretical cryptography. In this setting, Alice and Bob each receives a sequence of random bits drawn from a noise model, while Eve, the eavesdropper, also possesses some information about the bits. Alice and Bob wish to ‘reconcile’ their information via an ‘information reconciliation protocol’, where they exchange information in a noiseless, public channel in order to agree on a random string U with very high probability. Therefore, information reconciliation protocols are somewhat like correlation distillation protocols. However, the primary concern for information reconciliation is *privacy*, i.e., that Eve gains almost no information about U . Intuitively, since Eve can see the conversation between Alice and Bob, maximum privacy would be achieved if information reconciliation can be performed without communication.

1.2.2. Random beacons

A random beacon is an entity that broadcasts uncorrelated, unbiased random bits. The concept of random beacons was first introduced in 1983 by Rabin [18], who showed how they can be used to solve various problems in cryptography. From then on, random beacons have found many applications in security and cryptography [2,5,10,11,14]. There are many proposals for constructing a *publicly verifiable* random beacon; among them are those that use the signals from a cosmic source [16]. In these proposals, Alice (as the beacon owner) and Bob (as the verifier) both point a telescope at an extraterrestrial object, e.g. a pulsar, and then measure the signals from it. Presumably these signals contain a sufficient amount of randomness. Then Alice converts her measurement results into a sequence of random bits, and publishes them as beacon bits. Bob can then verify the bits by performing his own measurement and conversion. However, it is inevitable that there would be discrepancies in the results of Alice and Bob, due to measurement errors (described by a noise model). These discrepancies may cause the beacon bits published by Alice to disagree with those computed by Bob. One of the major concerns in the study on random beacons is to prevent *cheating* in the presence of measurement error. In other words, one needs to design a mechanism to prevent Alice from maliciously modifying her measurement data in order to affect the beacon bits, while pretending that the modification comes from the measurement error. Notice that, in general, there is no communication between Alice and Bob. We note that if NICD is possible, then the cheating problem would be solved, since NICD protocols can be used to distill almost perfectly correlated bits. Then, with very high probability, the bits output by Alice and Bob should agree, and this essentially removes the measurement error.

1.2.2.1. Related work. As we have discussed, the problem of NICD lies, in some sense, at the foundations of both the studies of information reconciliation and random beacons. In fact, researchers from both areas have, to some extent, considered the problem of NICD. In particular, a basic version of the problem concerning a very special type of NICD protocol over the symmetric noise model was discovered and proven independently by several researchers since as early as 1991, including Alon, Maurer, and Wigderson [1] and Mossel and O’Donnell [16]. They proved that NICD is

impossible over the binary symmetric noise model, if the protocol is deterministic and must have completely unbiased output (i.e., $\Pr[X = 0] = \Pr[Y = 0] = 1/2$). Mossel and O’Donnell studied the *multi-party* version of this problem, where $k > 2$ parties wish to agree on some random bits. They are interested in whether the k parties can succeed with a reasonable probability (inverse polynomial in k), rather than with high probability (close to 1), as in this paper. They also only considered the binary symmetric noise model. In fact, we are not aware of any prior work that studies NICD beyond the binary symmetric noise model.

We stress the importance of understanding the problem of NICD for general noise models. As we have mentioned, this problem is important to the studies of both information reconciliation and random beacons. In both cases, there is no reason to assume that the binary symmetric noise model is the only reasonable one. As an example, the measurement of the signals from extraterrestrial objects is not unique, and different measurements may yield different noise models. If one of these noise models admits NICD, then the problems of information reconciliation and random beacon could, in some sense, be solved. Therefore, a better understanding of NICD over a more general class of noise models would be very helpful. Furthermore, it is equally important to consider randomized protocols and ones that output *near-perfectly unbiased*, instead of *completely unbiased*, bits.² However, the previous results do not cover these cases.

1.3. Our Contribution

We study NICD beyond the binary symmetric noise model. First, we prove an impossibility result for NICD over a class of so-called ‘regular’ noise models in Section 3. Intuitively, a noise model \mathcal{N} is regular if it satisfies the following three requirements: that it is *symmetric*, i.e., $\mathcal{N}(a, b) = \mathcal{N}(b, a)$ for every $a, b \in \Sigma$; that it is *marginally uniform*, i.e., both the marginal distributions of the inputs of Alice and Bob are uniform; and that it is *connected*, i.e., Σ cannot be partitioned into Σ_0 and Σ_1 such that $\mathcal{N}(a, b) = \mathcal{N}(b, a) = 0$ for all $a \in \Sigma_0$ and $b \in \Sigma_1$. Notice that if a noise model is not connected, then NICD is indeed possible for such a model. Suppose that Σ is partitioned into Σ_0 and Σ_1 . If Alice and Bob interpret symbols in Σ_0 as a ‘0’ and symbols in Σ_1 as a ‘1’, then they essentially have a noiseless binary noise model, which admits NICD.

In Section 4, we move over to the binary erasure noise model. It is the simplest noise model that is not symmetric, and thus it is not regular. The binary erasure model is also a realistic one. Consider as an example the situation where Alice and Bob receive their inputs by observing a pulsar. It is quite likely that the noise of the measurements by Alice and Bob are of the ‘erasure-type’, i.e., the corruption of information can be detected. Furthermore, it is also possible that Alice and Bob have different measurement apparatus and different levels of accuracy. In the random beacon problem, Alice (as the beacon owner) might own a more sophisticated (and more expensive) measuring device with higher accuracy, while Bob (as the verifier) has a more noisy measurement device. An extreme case would be that Alice has perfect accuracy in her measurement, but Bob’s measurement is noisy. Such a situation can be described by the binary erasure noise model. We prove that NICD is impossible for this noise model as well.

The impossibility results that we prove suggest that, for many noise models, communication is essential for correlation distillation. Thus it is interesting to ask how much communication is essential and, in particular, if a single bit of communication helps. In Section 5, we answer this question by presenting a protocol that non-trivially distills correlation from the binary symmetric noise model with one bit of communication. Notice that to make the problem interesting, Alice and Bob need to each output two bits. This result shows that even the minimal amount of communication is provably more powerful than no communication at all. The protocol itself may also be of its own interest.

2. Preliminaries and notations

We use $[n]$ to denote the set $\{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$. We often work with symbols from a particular *alphabet*, which is a finite set of cardinality q and is normally denoted by Σ . We often identify Σ with $[q]$.

All vectors are column vectors by default. A *string* is a sequence of symbols from an alphabet. We identify a string with a vector and use them interchangeably. For a string x of length n , we use $x[j]$ to denote its j th entry, for

² From a practical point of view, if, for a protocol P , both $\Pr[X = 0]$ and $\Pr[Y = 0]$ are ϵ -close to $1/2$ for some small ϵ , then it is ϵ -close to a perfectly unbiased protocol in terms of statistical distance.

$j = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$. We use $\mathbf{1}_n$ to denote the all-one vector (each of whose entries is 1) of dimension n . When the dimension is clear from the context, it is often omitted.

We identify a function with its truth table, which is written as a vector. For example, we view a function over $\{0, 1\}^n$ also as a 2^n -dimensional vector. We assume a canonical ordering of n -bit strings.

We will work with tensor products. Let A and B both be vectors or both be matrices. We use $A \otimes B$ to denote the tensor product of A and B , and $A^{\otimes n}$ to denote the n th tensor power of A , which is the tensor product of n copies of A .

Definition 1 (*Noise Model*). A noise model over an alphabet Σ , often denoted by \mathcal{N} , is a probabilistic distribution over $\Sigma \times \Sigma$. The n th tensor power of a noise model \mathcal{N} is the distribution of a pair of length- n strings (A, B) , where $A = a_0a_1 \cdots a_{n-1}$ and $B = b_0b_1 \cdots b_{n-1}$, and (a_k, b_k) is independently drawn from \mathcal{N} for $k = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$.

In this paper we study *randomized, non-interactive* protocols.³

For the impossibility results in Sections 3 and 4, we assume that Alice and Bob each output a single bit, since it suffices to prove a negative result on the ‘minimally useful’ protocols. We shall consider protocols that output multiple bits in Section 5.

Since Alice and Bob do not communicate, the most general thing that they can do is to apply a (randomized) function to their private inputs and output a bit. Therefore, we define a protocol as a pair of functions.

Definition 2 (*Protocols*). A protocol \mathcal{P} over a noise model \mathcal{N} is a family of function pairs (ϕ_n^A, ϕ_n^B) for $n > 0$, where $\phi_n^A, \phi_n^B : \Sigma^n \mapsto [-1, 1]$ are called the *characteristic functions*. The *output* of protocol \mathcal{P} over noise model \mathcal{N} , denoted by $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{N})$, is a sequence of distributions $\{\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2, \dots\}$, where the n th distribution \mathcal{D}_n is of the bit pair (X_n, Y_n) , defined as follows.

$$(a, b) \leftarrow \mathcal{N}^{\otimes n}; x \leftarrow \phi_n^A(a), y \leftarrow \phi_n^B(b); X_n \leftarrow \mathbf{B}_{(1+x)/2}, Y_n \leftarrow \mathbf{B}_{(1+y)/2} : (X_n, Y_n)$$

\mathbf{B}_p is the *Bernoulli Distribution* of parameter p , defined as $\mathbf{B}_p(0) = 1 - p$ and $\mathbf{B}_p(1) = p$.

The intuition behind the definition is as follows. Since a protocol can be probabilistic, its output bit over any input can be a (Bernoulli) probabilistic distribution. For different inputs, the Bernoulli distribution of the corresponding output bit would be different. Thus we define the characteristic functions to describe the Bernoulli distributions.

Definition 3 (*Statistical Distance*). The *statistical distance* between two probabilistic distributions A and B , denoted as $\text{SD}(A, B)$, is defined to be $\text{SD}(A, B) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_x |A(x) - B(x)|$, where the summation is taken over the support of A and B . If $\text{SD}(A, B) \leq \epsilon$, we say A is ϵ -close to B .

Definition 4 (δ -Locally Uniform Protocols). A protocol \mathcal{P} is δ -locally uniform over a noise model \mathcal{N} , if for every $n > 0$, both X_n and Y_n are δ -close to the uniform distribution over $\{0, 1\}$, where (X_n, Y_n) is the n th distribution of $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{N})$. A protocol is *locally uniform* if it is 0-locally uniform.

Definition 5 (*Correlation of Protocols*). The *correlation* of a protocol \mathcal{P} over a noise model \mathcal{N} , denoted by $\text{Cor}_{\mathcal{N}}[\mathcal{P}]$, is defined to be

$$\text{Cor}_{\mathcal{N}}[\mathcal{P}] = \liminf_n \{2 \cdot \Pr[X_n = Y_n] - 1\} \quad (1)$$

where (X_n, Y_n) is the n th distribution of $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{N})$.

3. An impossibility result for regular noise models

We prove a general impossibility result for NICD over the regular noise models.

³ We do not know if randomized protocols are strictly more powerful than deterministic ones, although we suspect that they are. As a case in point, the ‘AND’ protocol in Section 5 is a randomized one, and we do not know any deterministic protocol that is locally uniform and has a comparable correlation.

Definition 6 (*Distribution Matrix*). Let \mathcal{N} be a noise model over Σ , where $|\Sigma| = q$. We say a $q \times q$ matrix M is the *distribution matrix* for \mathcal{N} , if $M_{x,y} = \mathcal{N}(x, y)$ for all $x, y \in \Sigma$.⁴ We write the distribution matrix of \mathcal{N} as $M_{\mathcal{N}}$.

Definition 7 (*Regular Noise Model*). A $q \times q$ matrix M is *regular* if it is symmetric, and $\mathbf{1}_q$ is the unique eigenvector with the largest absolute eigenvalue. Let ϵ be the difference between M 's largest absolute eigenvalue and the second largest. We call $q \cdot \epsilon$ the *scaled eigenvalue gap* of M . A noise model \mathcal{N} is *regular* if its distribution matrix is regular.

The regular noise model may appear a little counter-intuitive, especially with respect to the intuition in Section 1.3. We briefly explain the connection here. Notice that a distribution matrix M is non-negative (that every entry is non-negative). By the Perron–Frobenius Theorem [13], if M is symmetric, irreducible (meaning that it is ‘connected’), and has $\mathbf{1}_q$ as an eigenvector, then $\mathbf{1}_q$ is the unique eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue, and thus M is regular.

The following is a well-known result in matrix theory; for example, see [12]. We will use this lemma in our proof of Theorem 1.

Lemma 1. Let A be an $a \times a$ matrix of eigenvectors v_0, \dots, v_{a-1} , with corresponding eigenvalues $\lambda_0, \dots, \lambda_{a-1}$. Let B be a $b \times b$ matrix of eigenvectors u_0, \dots, u_{b-1} , with corresponding eigenvalues μ_0, \dots, μ_{b-1} . Then the eigenvalues of the matrix $A \otimes B$ are $v_i \otimes u_j$ with corresponding eigenvalues $\lambda_i \cdot \mu_j$, for $i \in [a]$ and $j \in [b]$.

Theorem 1. If \mathcal{N} is a regular noise model over Σ with scaled eigenvalue gap ϵ , then the correlation of any δ -locally uniform protocol over \mathcal{N} is at most $1 - \epsilon(1 - 4\delta^2)$.

Proof. Consider a protocol \mathcal{P} over the noise model \mathcal{N} . We define $q = |\Sigma|$ and identify Σ with $[q]$ for the rest of the proof. We use M to denote the distribution matrix of \mathcal{N} and denote the eigenvector of M by v_0, v_1, \dots, v_{q-1} with corresponding eigenvalues $\lambda_0, \dots, \lambda_{q-1}$. We assume that $|\lambda_0| > |\lambda_1| \geq \dots \geq |\lambda_{q-1}|$. Since M is regular, λ_0 is the unique largest eigenvalue that corresponds to eigenvector $\mathbf{1}_q$.

Since M is the distribution matrix, we know that the sum of all its entries is 1. Thus we have

$$1 = \mathbf{1}_q^T \cdot M \cdot \mathbf{1}_q = \lambda_0 \cdot \mathbf{1}_q^T \cdot \mathbf{1}_q = \lambda_0 \cdot q,$$

or $\lambda_0 = 1/q$. Since the scaled eigenvalue gap of M is ϵ , we know that $|\lambda_1| = (1 - \epsilon)/q$.

Consider the characteristic functions ϕ_n^A and ϕ_n^B . It is easy to see that

$$\Pr[X_n = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[1 + \sum_{a \in \Sigma^n} \sum_{b \in \Sigma^n} \mathcal{N}^{\otimes n}(a, b) \cdot \phi^A(a) \right]. \quad (2)$$

Clearly, $M^{\otimes n}$ is the distribution matrix for $\mathcal{N}^{\otimes n}$. We will be using a result about the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of M^{\otimes} , stated in Lemma 1.

Since \mathcal{P} is δ -locally uniform, we have

$$\left| \sum_{a \in \Sigma^n} \sum_{b \in \Sigma^n} \mathcal{N}^{\otimes n}(a, b) \cdot \phi^A(a) \right| \leq 2\delta \quad (3)$$

or $|(\phi^A)^T \cdot M^{\otimes n} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{q^n}| \leq 2\delta$, as we identify ϕ^A with the q^n -dimensional vector represented by its truth table. Since $\mathbf{1}_q$ is an eigenvector of M with eigenvalue $1/q$, $\mathbf{1}_{q^n}$ is an eigenvector of $M^{\otimes n}$ with eigenvalue $1/q^n$ (see Lemma 1). Since M is symmetric, so is $M^{\otimes n}$. Thus we have

$$|\mathbf{1}_{q^n}^T \cdot \phi^A| \leq 2\delta \cdot q^n. \quad (4)$$

Similarly, we have

$$|\mathbf{1}_{q^n}^T \cdot \phi^B| \leq 2\delta \cdot q^n. \quad (5)$$

⁴ Here we identify Σ with $[q]$.

Now, we consider the correlation of \mathcal{P} . Let (X_n, Y_n) be the outputs of Alice and Bob. Then we have

$$2 \cdot \Pr[X_n = Y_n] - 1 = \sum_{A \in \Sigma^n} \sum_{B \in \Sigma^n} \mathcal{N}^{\otimes n}(A, B) \cdot \phi^A(A) \cdot \phi^B(B). \quad (6)$$

In other words, we have

$$2 \cdot \Pr[X_n = Y_n] - 1 = (\phi^A)^T \cdot M^{\otimes n} \cdot \phi^B. \quad (7)$$

We diagonalize the matrix $M^{\otimes n}$. First we define a natural notion of inner product: $\langle A, B \rangle = \frac{1}{q^n} \sum_{x \in \Sigma^n} A[x]B[x]$. It is obvious that, under this inner product, both ϕ_n^A and ϕ_n^B have norm at most 1. Since $M^{\otimes n}$ is symmetric, it has a set of eigenvectors that form an orthonormal basis. We denote the eigenvectors of $M^{\otimes n}$ by u_t with corresponding eigenvalues μ_t , where $t \in [q^n]$. We assume that $|\mu_0| \geq |\mu_1| \geq \dots \geq |\mu_{q^n-1}|$. By Lemma 1, the eigenvalues μ_t are of the form $\prod_{i=1}^n \lambda_{k_i}$, where $k_i \in [q]$. Therefore $M^{\otimes n}$ has a unique maximum eigenvalue $\mu_0 = \lambda_0^n = 1/q^n$, which corresponds to the eigenvector $\mathbf{1}_q^{\otimes n} = \mathbf{1}_{q^n}$. The second largest absolute eigenvalue of $M^{\otimes n}$ is $|\mu_1| = \lambda_0^{n-1} \cdot |\lambda_1| = (1 - \epsilon)/q^n$.

Now we perform a Fourier analysis of vectors ϕ^A and ϕ^B . We write $\phi^A = \sum_{t \in [q^n]} \alpha_t \cdot u_t$ and $\phi^B = \sum_{t \in [q^n]} \beta_t \cdot u_t$. Then, by Parseval, we have $\sum_t \alpha_t^2 \leq 1$, $\sum_t \beta_t^2 \leq 1$. Furthermore, from (4) and (5), we have $|\alpha_0| = \frac{1}{q^n} |\mathbf{1}_{q^n}^T \cdot \phi^A| \leq 2\delta$ and $|\beta_0| = \frac{1}{q^n} |\mathbf{1}_{q^n}^T \cdot \phi^B| \leq 2\delta$.

Putting things together, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cor}_{\mathcal{N}^{\otimes n}}[\mathcal{P}] &= (\phi^A)^T \cdot M^{\otimes n} \cdot \phi^B \\ &= q^n \cdot \sum_{t \in [q^n]} \alpha_t \cdot \beta_t \cdot \mu_t \\ &\leq \epsilon \cdot |\alpha_0 \beta_0| + (1 - \epsilon) \sum_{t \in [q^n]} |\alpha_t \cdot \beta_t| \quad (\text{eigenvalue gap}) \\ &\leq \epsilon \cdot 4\delta^2 + (1 - \epsilon) \left(\sum_t \alpha_t^2 \right) \left(\sum_t \beta_t^2 \right) \quad (\text{Cauchy-Schwartz}) \\ &\leq 1 - \epsilon(1 - 4\delta^2). \end{aligned}$$

The theorem is proved. \square

Definition 8 (*Binary Symmetric Noise Model*). The *binary symmetric noise model* is a distribution over alphabet $\{0, 1\}$, denoted by \mathcal{S}_p and is defined as $\mathcal{S}(0, 0) = \mathcal{S}(1, 1) = (1 - p)/2$ and $\mathcal{S}(0, 1) = \mathcal{S}(1, 0) = p/2$.

Corollary 1. *The correlation of any locally uniform protocol over the binary symmetric noise model \mathcal{S}_p is at most $1 - 2p$.*

It is easy to see that this bound is tight, since the naïve protocol where both Alice and Bob output their first bits is locally uniform with correlation $1 - 2p$.

Proof. Notice that \mathcal{S}_p is regular with scaled eigenvalue gap $2p$. \square

This corollary was discovered independently by various researchers, including Alon, Maurer, and Wigderson [1], and Mossel and O'Donnell [16], and the latter attributing it as ‘folklore’.

4. The binary erasure noise model

We prove a similar impossibility result for another noise model, namely the binary erasure noise model. Intuitively, this model describes the situation where Alice sends an unbiased bit to Bob, which is erased (and replaced by a special symbol \perp) with probability p . Notice that it is not a symmetric model and thus is not covered by the result in the previous section.

Definition 9 (*Binary Erasure Noise Model*). The *binary erasure noise model* is a distribution over alphabet $\{0, 1, \perp\}$, denoted by \mathcal{E}_p and defined as $\mathcal{E}(0, 0) = \mathcal{E}(1, 1) = (1 - p)/2$, $\mathcal{E}(0, \perp) = \mathcal{E}(1, \perp) = p/2$.

Notice that, in this model, Alice's input is the uniform distribution over $\{0, 1\}$, and Bob's input is 0 and 1 with probability $(1 - p)/2$ each, and \perp with probability p . A naïve protocol under this model only uses the first pair of the inputs. Alice outputs her bit, and Bob outputs his bit if his input is 0 or 1, and outputs a random bit if his input is \perp . This is a locally uniform protocol with correlation $1 - p$. The next theorem shows that no protocol can do much better than the naïve protocol.

Theorem 2. *The correlation of any locally uniform protocol over the noise model \mathcal{E}_p is at most $\sqrt{1 - p(1 - 4\delta^2)}$.*

Proof. We introduce more notations. A *binary string* is a string over alphabet $\{0, 1\}$. For a binary string x , we denote its *Hamming weight* by $|x|$, which is the number of 1s in x . We call a vector v over alphabet $\{0, 1, \perp\}$ an *extended bit vector*, and define its *degree*, denoted by $\deg(v)$, to be the number of \perp s in it. An *error vector*, denoted by u , is a vector over alphabet $\{\star, \perp\}$, and its *degree* is also the number of \perp s in it. Taking a k -dimensional bit vector v and an n -dimensional error vector u of degree $(n - k)$, we define their *composition* to be an n -dimensional extended bit vector x defined as

$$x[i] = \begin{cases} v[j] & \text{if } u[i] = \star \text{ and } j = |\{l : 0 \leq l < i, u[l] = \star\}| \\ \perp & \text{if } u[i] = \perp \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

and we write this as $x = v \triangleright u$. As an example, we have $(1, 0, 1) \triangleright (\perp, \star, \star, \perp, \star) = (\perp, 1, 0, \perp, 1)$. Notice that every extended bit vector x can be written uniquely as such a composition of a bit vector v and an error vector u . So we denote v to be the *extracted bit vector* of x , and write it as $v = [x]$; we denote u to be the *error vector* of x and write it as $u = \{x\}$.

For a bit vector x and an extended bit vector v , both of dimension n , we say that x is *consistent* with v if, for every i such that $v[i] \neq \perp$, we have $x[i] = v[i]$. We denote this as $x \sqsubseteq v$.

For a bit vector x and an error vector u of degree d , we define the *restricted vector* of x with respect to u to be the unique $(n - d)$ -dimensional bit vector v such that $x \sqsubseteq (v \triangleright u)$, and we write this as $v = x|_u$. The *excluded vector* of x with respect to u is the d -dimensional vector v' defined to be $v'[i] = x[k]$, where $k = |\{j : 0 \leq j < i, u[j] = \star\}|$. We also write $x = v \overset{u}{\leftarrow} v'$, and say that x is *joined* by v and v' with respect to u .

We now fix a protocol \mathcal{P} and consider its characteristic functions ϕ^A and ϕ^B (we omit the subscript n). Both are real functions over $\{0, 1, \perp\}^n$. Since we are in the erasure model, the input to Alice never contains \perp , so we can assume that ϕ^A is a function over $\{0, 1\}^n$. We perform Fourier analysis on ϕ^A , using parity functions as the orthonormal basis:

$$\phi^A(x) = \sum_s \alpha_s \oplus_s(x) \quad (9)$$

where we have $\sum_s \alpha_s^2 \leq 1$. Since \mathcal{P} is δ -locally uniform, we have

$$|\alpha_0| \leq 2\delta. \quad (10)$$

The analysis for ϕ^B is more complicated. We decompose ϕ^B into 2^n 'sub-functions', according to the 2^n error vectors. For error vector u , we define a function ψ_u that maps $(n - k)$ -dimensional bit vectors to $\{-1, +1\}$, where k is the degree of u . Then we perform a Fourier analysis for every sub-function, and write

$$\psi_u(x) = \sum_s \beta_{u,s} \oplus_s(x). \quad (11)$$

Again we have $\sum_s \beta_{u,s}^2 \leq 1$ for every error vector u .

We define $\lambda = p/(1 - p)$. Then it is easy to see that the probability that Bob receives an extended error vector of degree d is $\lambda^d \cdot (1 - p)^n$. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that

$$\sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^{\deg(u)} = \sum_{k=0}^n \binom{n}{k} \lambda^k = \frac{1}{(1 - p)^n}. \quad (12)$$

For the rest of the proof, we write λ^u as shorthand for $\lambda^{\deg(u)}$.

Finally, we estimate the correlation between the outputs. We denote this by η , and it is not hard to see that

$$\eta = \left(\frac{1-p}{2}\right)^n \sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \sum_x \phi^A(x) \psi_u(x|u). \quad (13)$$

By substituting in the Fourier coefficients, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \eta &= \left(\frac{1-p}{2}\right)^n \sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \sum_x \sum_{s \subseteq \{0,1\}^n} \sum_{t \subseteq \{0,1\}^{n-\deg(u)}} \alpha_s \beta_t \oplus_s(x) \oplus_t(x|u) \\ &= \left(\frac{1-p}{2}\right)^n \sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \sum_{s \subseteq \{0,1\}^n} \sum_{t \subseteq \{0,1\}^{n-\deg(u)}} \alpha_s \beta_t \left(\sum_x \oplus_s(x) \oplus_t(x|u) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Now, we fix an error vector u of degree r , and fix sets s, t . We write $s = s_0 \cup s_1$, such that for every $i \in s_0$ we have $u[i] = \star$ and for every $i \in s_1$ we have $u[i] = \perp$. We write this as $s_0 = s|_u$. If $s_1 = \emptyset$, we say that s is *consistent* with u , and we write this as $s \sqsubseteq u$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} \oplus_s(x) \oplus_t(x|u) &= \sum_{v \in \{0,1\}^{n-d}} \sum_{v' \in \{0,1\}^d} \oplus_{s_0}(v) \oplus_{s_1}(v') \oplus_t(v) \\ &= \sum_{v \in \{0,1\}^{n-d}} \oplus_{s_0 \oplus t}(v) \sum_{v' \in \{0,1\}^d} \oplus_{s_1}(v'). \end{aligned}$$

So the only time we get non-zero as a result is when $s_0 = t$ and $s_1 = \emptyset$, which means that $s = t$. Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \eta &= (1-p)^n \sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \sum_{s \sqsubseteq u} \alpha_s \beta_{u, s|u} \\ &\leq (1-p)^n \left(\sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \right)^{1/2} \cdot \left[\sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \left(\sum_{s \sqsubseteq u} \alpha_s \beta_{u, s|u} \right)^2 \right]^{1/2} \quad (\text{Cauchy-Schwartz}) \\ &= (1-p)^{n/2} \cdot \left[\sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \cdot \left(\sum_{s \sqsubseteq u} \alpha_s^2 \right) \cdot \left(\sum_{s \sqsubseteq u} \beta_{u, s|u}^2 \right) \right]^{1/2} \quad (\text{Eq. (12)}) \\ &\leq (1-p)^{n/2} \cdot \left[\sum_{u \in \{\star, \perp\}^n} \lambda^u \cdot \left(\sum_{s \sqsubseteq u} \alpha_s^2 \right) \right]^{1/2} \quad (\text{Parseval, } \sum_{s \sqsubseteq u} \beta_{u, s|u}^2 \leq 1) \\ &= (1-p)^{n/2} \cdot \left[\sum_s \alpha_s^2 \sum_{u: s \sqsubseteq u} \lambda^u \right]^{1/2} \\ &= (1-p)^{n/2} \cdot \left[\sum_s \alpha_s^2 \cdot (1+\lambda)^{n-|s|} \right]^{1/2} \\ &\leq (1-p)^{n/2} \left[(1+\lambda)^{n-1} (1+4\delta^2(1+\lambda)) \right]^{1/2} \quad (\text{Eq. (10)}) \\ &= \sqrt{1-p(1-4\delta^2)}. \end{aligned}$$

The theorem is proved. \square

We suspect that the bound of [Theorem 2](#) is not a tight bound (we conjecture that the tight bound should be $1-p$), but it is sufficient to show that it is bounded away from 1 and is independent of n . Therefore, even with perfect accuracy in Alice's measurement, NICD is impossible if Bob's measurement is noisy.

We mention that it is possible to obtain an alternative proof of [Theorem 2](#) by building on the results of O'Donnell [17].

5. A one-bit communication protocol

We present a protocol that non-trivially distills correlation over the binary symmetric noise model with one bit of communication. Recall that no non-interactive, locally uniform protocol can have a correlation more than $1 - 2p$. Now, we consider protocols with one bit of communication. Suppose that Alice sends one bit to Bob, which Bob receives with perfect accuracy. With one bit of communication, Alice can generate an unbiased bit x and send it to Bob, and then Alice and Bob both output x . This protocol has perfect correlation. Thus, to make the problem non-trivial, we require that Alice and Bob must output two bits each. Suppose that Alice outputs (X_1, X_2) and Bob outputs (Y_1, Y_2) . We define the correlation of a protocol to be $2 \cdot \min_{i=1,2} \{\Pr[X_i = Y_i]\} - 1$. In this situation, we say a protocol is *locally uniform* if both (X_1, X_2) and (Y_1, Y_2) are uniformly distributed.

Now we describe a locally uniform protocol of correlation about $1 - 3p/2$. The protocol is called the ‘AND’ protocol. Both Alice and Bob only take the first two bits as their inputs. Alice directly outputs her bits, and sends the AND of her bits to Bob. Then, intuitively, Bob ‘guesses’ Alice’s bits using the Bayes rule and outputs them. A technical issue is that Bob has to ‘balance’ his output so that the protocol is still locally uniform. The detailed description is in Fig. 1.

```

STEP I  Alice computes  $r := a_1 \wedge a_2$ , sends  $r$  to Bob, and outputs  $(a_1, a_2)$ .
STEP II Bob, upon receiving  $r$  from Alice:
        IF  $r = 1$  THEN output  $(1, 1)$ .
        ELSE IF  $b_1 = b_2 = 1$  THEN output
            .  $(0, 0)$  with probability  $p/(2 - p)$ ;
            .  $(0, 1)$  with probability  $(1 - p)/(2 - p)$ ;
            .  $(1, 0)$  with probability  $(1 - p)/(2 - p)$ ;
        ELSE output  $(b_1, b_2)$ .
  
```

Fig. 1. The AND protocol: Alice receives input bits a_1, a_2 and Bob receives input bits b_1, b_2 , where (a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2) is drawn from $S_p^{\otimes 2}$.

We can easily verify (by a straightforward computation) the following result.

Theorem 3. *The AND protocol is a locally uniform protocol with correlation $1 - \frac{3p}{2} + \frac{p^2}{4-2p}$. \square*

This is a constant-factor improvement over the non-interactive case.

This result may seem a little surprising. It appears that Alice does not fully utilize the one-bit communication, since she sends an AND of two bits, whose entropy is less than 1. It is tempting to speculate that, by having Alice send the XOR of the two bits, Alice and Bob can obtain a better result, since Bob gets more information. Nevertheless, the XOR does not work, in some sense due to its ‘symmetry’. Here we provide some intuition. Consider the case where Alice sends the XOR of her bits to Bob. Bob can compute the XOR of his bits, and if the two XORs agree, then Bob knows that, with high probability, both of his bits agree with Alice’s. However, if the two XORs do not agree, Bob knows that one of his bits is ‘corrupted’, but he has no information about which one. Furthermore, however Bob guesses, he will be wrong with probability $1/2$. On the other hand, in the AND protocol, if Bob receives a ‘1’ as the AND of the bits from Alice, he knows for sure that Alice has $(1, 1)$ and thus he simply outputs $(1, 1)$; if $r = 0$ and $b_1 = b_2 = 1$, he knows that his input is ‘corrupted’, and he ‘guesses’ Alice’s bit according to the Bayes rule of posterior probabilities. If Bob receives a ‘0’ as the AND and $(b_1, b_2) \neq (1, 1)$, then the data looks ‘consistent’ and Bob just outputs his bits. In this way, $1/4$ of the time (when Bob receives a 1), Bob knows Alice’s bits for sure and can achieve perfect correlation; otherwise Alice and Bob behave almost as in the non-interactive case, which gives $1 - 2p$ correlation. So the overall correlation is about $1/4 \cdot 1 + (3/4) \cdot (1 - 2p) = 1 - 3p/2$.

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